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.District Court of the Tnited States, District of Wisconsn.-In
Admiralty.
PETER W. BADGELY VS. THE SCHOONER JUNIATA PATON.
1. Where a bill of lading contains the clause "dangers of navigation excepted,"
the carrier brings himself within the clause, when he shows that on a dark and
stormy night, at the entrance of a harbor difficult of access, he-mistook a light on
shore in a line with the pier light, for the latter, whereby the vessel went ashore
and damaged a portion of the cargo.
2. The carrier, in order to avail himself of the benefit of this restrictive clause,
must bring hiscase strictly within the -words of the exception, and for this purpose the burden of proof is upon him.
3. A master may enter a harbor on a dark night, with a heavy sea and high wind,
though the access be difficult but not unusually dangerous, without incurring the
imputation of negligence.

The facts fully appear in the opinion of the Court; which was
delivered by
MILLER, J.--This libellant shipped at the port of Buffalo, on
board this vessel, twenty-seven hogsheads and ten barrels of sugar,
"to be delivered at the Port of Milwaukie in good order and condition, the dangers of navigation excepted."
This -vessel belonged at Milwaukie, and the 'whole cargo, consisting of railroad iron and other iron, and these sugars, was consigned to that port. The vessel reached the Milwaukie bay, on the
western shore of Lake Michigan, about one o'clock at night, in a
storm of rain, high wind from the north-east, very heavy sea, and
night Very dark. The light-house light is over one mile and a half
from the harbor, at the mouth of the Milwaukie river, where it was
usual to have an additional light. After the vessel made the lighthouse light, she stood for the harbor, intending to put in. She
made a light, which was believed to be the light on the pier, it
being in the same range and resembling the pier light at the har-
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bor,-but it turned out to be a light on shore. The mistake was
not discovered until immediately before the vessel struck. About
ninety per cent. of the sugar was lost, by the accumulation of
water in the hold.
The Steamboat Baltic was making for the same light, following
close in the wake of the Paton, under the belief that it was the
harbor light, and did not discover the mistake until the schooner
struck, when she put about and saved herself.
The master of the Paton was, no doubt from the evidence, competent, and the vessel and crew were in every respect sufficient.
It appears, also, that all hands aboard were vigilant and faithful,
in the discharge of their duties. That they were at their posts,
and that the master once went aloft to satisfy himself of the light.
The owners of schooners engaged in the carrying trade upon the
lakes, are common carriers, and liable as such, unless the loss should
occur in an excepted peril. The risks, for which common carriers
are liable at common law, include those of all losses, except by the
act of God, or the common enemy. In the implied, or common
law exception, of the act of God, the cause of the casualty must be
immediate, and stripped of all human means or agency.
The exception, in this bill of lading, of the dangers of navigation, is to be understood in a broader sense, than to denote natural
accidents. It extends to events not attributable to natural causes.
It is extended so as to excuse the carrier from losses, by collision
of two ships, when no blame is imputable to his ship. But there is
no doubt, the carrier should not be excused if the loss occurs by
a peril, which might have been avoided, by the exercise of any
reasonable skill or diligefice. See 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 232,
233, 284. Angell on Carriers, §§ 167 to 172. Abbott on Shipping, 284, 285, 286. Story on Bailments, §§ 510 to 512. Clark
and others vs. Bunnell and otthers, 12 Howard, 272. The case of
McArthur and Hurlbut vs. Sears, 21 Wendell's Rep. 190, is
quite similar to this; but the judgment of the Court was against
the defendant, as he stood chargeable as a common carrier without
this exception, in any qualification whatever.
The words forming the exception in this bill of lading, are
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understood in the same sense as in a policy of insurance. The
shipper is his own insurer against the dangers of navigation.
Where the benefit of an exception is claimed from loss, being
occasioned by a danger of the navigation, it is incumbent on the
carrier to bring himself strictly within the terms of it. It is by
no means unreasonable, to require him to prove the loss and the
manner of it, and that usual care and diligence had been used to
avoid it. This is peculiarly within his own knowledge, or of those
in his employment and under his control. The bailor, or shipper
is left, in a great measure, at the carrier's mercy, from the fact that
he has the exclusive custody of the goods, and to convict him of
negligence is almost impossible. The crew of the vessel are usually
the only persons cognizant of the matter, and are not expected to
implicate themselves. And the owner can seldom have any other
account of his property, or of the facts connected with its loss,
than what they may choose to give. For these reasons, testimony
from those employed on board, in support of the exemption claimed,
must be cautiously considered. But, fortunately for the respondent,
the testimony of these witnesses is corroborated in every essential
particular, by the mate of the Steamboat Baltic, and other disinterested witnesses.
It was contended, that the vessel should have kept out over
night, and should not have attempted entering the harbor during
the gale and storm, in the extreme darkness of the night. Some
masters of vessels do not come in, nights; others do. The Baltic
was bound for Milwaukie, and intended coming in that night. The
Paton belonged at Milwaukie, and was freighted exclusively for
that port. The entrance at the harbor is not unusually dangerous
or difficult. The master if this vessel, under these circumstances,
was in the discharge of his duty, in coming into port with his'vessel
and cargo without delay. ' If he had kept out and the vessel been
lost, under the proof of the crew and of the mate of the Baltic, as
to their belief, that the light on shore was the harbor light, a liability might attach more readily than in this case.
In making for the harbor, the vessel stood westward, with the
light-house light one mile and a half north. The mouth of the
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harbor is nearly in line north and south with this light. The angle
of the vessel's position with this light, was not sufficient to have
admonished those aboard, of their near approach upon the shore.
The sea was running high, the vessel before the wind, and the
darkness of the night was so intense, as to render it impossible for
the master on deck, or aloft, to calculate with any degree of certainty, the distance to the light on shore.
It was contended, that even if this vessel should be excused from
liability for being thus run ashore, the libel should be sustained by
reason of negligence, in not saving the sugar, by taking it out on
the succeeding day. On this point twenty-six witnesses were
examined, and I am well satisfied that the weight of the evidence
is against it. The sea did not abate until the evening of the ensuing day. Men could not pass from the beach to the vessel in a
scow; possibly they might in a small boat. The sea was breaking
over the vessel, so as to prevent working two of the pumps, or
opening the hatches. The vessel was hogged and so injured, that
more water was admitted than the three pumps could discharge,
even if they all could be worked.
On mature consideration of the case, I am of opinion that it
comes within the exception in the bill of lading, and that the
testimony is sufficient to excuse the loss, under that exception, and
that the libel should be dismissed.
Libel dismissed.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1852.
NATHANIEL

CUSHMAN vs. FRANCIS 0. J. SMITH.

1. The clause in constitutions which prohibits the taking of private property for
public use, was not designed to operate, and it does not operate to prohibit the
* legislative department from authorizing an exclusive occupation of private property temporarily, as an incipient proceeding to the acquisition of a title to it, or
to an easement in it.

2. Such clause was designed to operate, and it does operate to prevent the acquisition of any title to land, or to any easement in it, or to a permanent appropriation
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of it from an owner for public use, without the actual payment or tender of a inst
it.
compensation for
3. That the right to such temporary oceupation as an incipient proceeding, will
become extinct by an unreasonable delay to perfect proceedings, including the
actual payment or tender of compensation, to acquire a title to the land, or to an
easement In it.
4. That an action of trespass gua. cla. may be maintained to recovor damages for
the continuance of such occupation, unless compensation, or a tender of it, be
made within a reasonable time after the commencement of it.
5. That under such circumstances, an action of trespass, or an action on the case,
may be maintained to recover damages for all the injuries occasioned by the prior
occupation.

This was an action of trespass qua. cla. The plaintiff was the
owner of land upon which the Buckfield Branch Rail Road had been
made. The defence was, that the road had been legally located
upon that land, and that the acts alleged to be trespasses were done
in the rightful use of the road. It appeared that the land had
bedn taken and appropriated to the use of the road, according to
the statute provisions-that an appraisement of the damages had
been made in due form of law-that warrants of distress hhd been
issued to collect the amount of damages awarded' to the plaintiff,
who had been unable to obtain any satisfaction, the corporation
having no pioperty-the defendant having become the owner of the
road by a conveyance to him in mortgage.
SHEPLEY, C. J.-The action is trespass quare clausum. The
plaintiff is admitted to have been the owner of land upon which the
Buckfield Branch Rail Road has been made. The alleged acts of
trespass are admitted. The justification presented is, that the rail
road was legally located, constructed, and used upon the plaintiff's
land ; and that the' acts alleged to have been trespasses were done
in the rightful use of that road.
The act creating the corporation, auth6rized it to locate, construct,
and complete a rail road, on a prescribed course, between certain
places. It required that the corporation should "pay such damages
as shall be ascertained by the County Commissioners for the county
where such land or other property may be situated, in the same
manner and under the same conditions and limitations as are by
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law provided in the case of damages by the laying out of highways." And it provided that the land so taken shall "be held as
land taken and appropriated for public highways."
The corporation by its charter is entitled to all the powers, privileges and immunities, and subjected to all the duties and liabilities
prescribed in the eighty-first chapter of the revised statutes. By
that chapter, it was authorized to take and hold so much real estate
as might be necessary for the location, construction, and convenient
use of the road. That statute provides, that when an application
for an estimate of damages is made, either by the corporation or by
the owners of real estate, the Commissioners, if requested by any
such owner, shall require the corporation to give security to the
satisfaction of the Commissioners for the payment of all such
damages and costs as shall be awarded and finally determined by
a jury or otherwise, for the real estate so taken; and the right or
authority of said corporation to enter upon or use said real estate,
except for making surveys, is suspended until it shall give such
security.
The plaintiff appears to have presented to the County Commissioners, at their session held in the month of April, 1849, a petition
to have his damages assessed. It contained a request, that the
corporation should be required to give security for the payment of
them. An assessment of damages was made by the Commissioners,
and entered of record, at their session, held in the month of December, 1849. At their session held in the month of June, 1850, the
plaintiff united in a petition with others to have his damages assessed
by a jury. The parties agreed upon a committee instead of a jury,
and that committee made a'report of their revision and assessment
of damages at the session of the Commissioners held in the month
of December, 1850; and an order was then made that the corporation should give security for payment of the damages awarded. A
warrant for colle-ticn of the damages, issued on February 6, 1851,
was returned on April 28, 1851, in no part satisfied. The damages
awarded have never been paid; nor has any security been given for
their payment.
The provision of the statute authorizing petitions for the assess-
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ment of damages to be presented at any time within three years,
and not afterward, and that requiring that the damages should be
assessed as in laying out of highways, and that respecting security
for their payment, clearly indicate that it was not the intention of
the Legislature to require an assessment and payment of damages
to be made before an exclusive occupation of the land was authorized
for the purpose of making the road.
If such be a correct construction of the act, and of all other acts
respecting the construction of railroads in this State, deriving their
powers from the general act regulating the construction and use of
such roads, the public must suffer great inconvenience, if they must
be regarded as in conflict with any provision of the Constitution.
If a rail road or highway cannot be established and constructed
without a previous assessment and payment, or tender of damages,
great obstacles and delays will be interposed to prevent the completion of such public improvements.
These considerations would, however, afford no justification for
an attempt to uphold such statute provisions, and to continue the
long established course of proceeding, in violation of any provision
of the constitution.
There has been a serious difference of opinion respecting the
requirements and construction of those constitutional provisions,
which declare, in the same or similar terms, that "private property
shall not be taken for public uses without just compensation."
How far legislation may proceed to authorize acts to be done
ithout first making or tendering compensation, and where it
becomes arrested by the provision, has been considered by many
of the ablest men and most distinguished jurists of the country.
And yet there is an indication arising out of the conflict of opinion,
and the difficulty of reconciling the positions attempted to be established with each other, and with any sound and pervading principle, that the whole truth has not been reached.
The more thoroughly it has been examined in connection with
legislative enactments, the more clearly has it been perceived that
serious difficulties, or inconveniences, or losses, may arise in the
rigid and uniform application of any suggested construction to the
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proceedings required in all classes of public improvements. How
can a construction be correct, which will allow acts to be done for
the purpose of making one kind of public improvement, and prohibit the like acts to be done, under like circumstances, for the
purpose of making another kind of public improvement; which
will authorize acts for the purpose of making a public highway, and
prohibit them for the purpose of making a railroad; which will
authorize them for the purpose of making a canal or railway, when
made by a state, county, city or town, and prohibit them when the
same public improvement is made by a private corporation? And
yet such may be the effect of many, if not of most of the constructions suggested or insisted upon. If, upon principle and sound
reasoning, the provision must operate alike upon the construction
of all classes of public improvements made by the appropriation of
private property to public use, the effect of any proposed construction of the clause may be examined, in its practical operation, to
ascertain if such could have been the intention of the framers of the
constitution.
If the construction be such as to require payment in all cases for
private property so taken, before it can be exclusively occupied for
public use, the result must be, that no such improvement can be
effectually or beneficially commenced, even by a state, county, city
or town, without waiting to have an assessment of damages first
made for each person whose estate is in some degree to be occupied,
upon the whole line of the contemplated improvement. Such a construction would prevent the laying out and making of highways
and streets over private estates believed to be benefited and not
injured thereby, before there had been an adjudication obtained,
that no damages were occasioned; and it would deprive persons,
thinking themselves aggrieved by such an adjudication* or by one
estimating the damages to be too little, in their judgment, from
having such adjudications revised, and finally determined by some
other tribunal, without delaying the progress of the public improvement.
It is believed to have been the long stablished course of proceeding, in this part of the country, to authorize the exclusive occupa-
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tion of land, required for such public uses as the laying out of highways and streets, by making provision by law for compensation to
the owner, to be subsequently paid; and, in many cases, authorizing
the damages to be finally ascertained, as well as paid subsequently.
This course of proceeding existed, so far as is known, without complaint, long before the Revolution, which cast off the British dominion, and, of course, was well known to the framers of the constitutions which first contained this prohibitory clause for the protection of private property. Was it the intention to interrupt such
a course of proceeding, and to provide a remedy for a grievance
already experienced, or only to prevent private property from being
taken from the owner, and permanently appropriated to public use
without compensation ? Constitutional provisions are often and
legitimately explained, by considering the actual state of facts at
the time of their adoption. Thus, the provision in the Constitution
of the United States for the regulation of commerce, is explained
to include navigation by reference to the state of facts existing at
the time.
By these and other considerations, many minds appear to have
been led to the conclusion that private property might be absolutely taken and permanently appropriated to public use without
compensation being first made, when provision was made by law for
compensation to be subsequently made from the treasury of the
state, or of a county, city or town.
Does experience teach that the owner, in such cases, -will always
be certain to obtain compensation ? History informs us that kingdoms and states have not always paid their just debts in full; that
they have often paid them only in promises, which would not command gold or silver without a large discount.
When the private property of citizens residing in a county, city
or town, may be taken to pay the debts of a corporation, there
may be more reason to expect that its debts will be certainly paid;
but the law making private property liable to be taken for payment
of the debts of such corporations may at any time be repealed or
altered, and the corporation, in its corporate capacity; may not
have property from which payment can be obtained.
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Is the distinction attempted to be made between taking private
property without first making compensation when provision is made
for payment by a state, county, city or town, and when it is made
for payment by a private corporation, a sound one ? Can that be
a correct construction of the provision which would authorize legislation by which the owner of an estate might be deprived of it
without being first paid, whenever, in the judgment of some court
or tribunal, it might be morally certain that he could afterwards
obtain compensation, and which would not authorize it, whenever,
in the judgment of such court or tribunal, it was not so certain that
he could obtain it; that would mak-, the title pass from the owner
to the public use, not upon payment of compensation, but upon the
opinion of certain official persons, that a fund or other means had
been provided, from which he might obtain payment ? If such be a
correct construction, it would follow that the title to private property may be made to pass from the owner to a private corporation
for public use, when that corporation should be found to possess the
means, or to furnish security, which would render it as certain that
compensation could be subsequently obtained from it as certainly
from the treasury of a state, county, city or town.
These and other considerations present themselves as serious
objections to a construction which would permit an owner of property to be deprived of it without compensation actually paid or
tendered to him, whether it be taken for public use by a* state,
county, city, town or private corporation.
If such a construction be inadmissible, as well as one which
would prevent an exclusive occupation of a temporary character
without payment or compensation, the inquiry is suggested, whether,
by a correct construction, such results may not be avoided.
This provision of the constitution was evidently not intended to
prevent the exercise of legislative power to prescribe the course of
proceedings to be pursued to take private property and appropriate
it to public use; nor to prevent its exercise to determine the manner in which the value of such property should be ascertained, and
payment made or tendered. The legislative power is left entirely
free from embarrasment in the selection and arrangement of the
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measures to be adopted to take private property and appropriate it
to public use, and to cause just compensation to be made therefor.
The provision was not introduced or intended to prevent legislation
authorizing acts to be done which might be more or less injurious
to private property not taken for public use. It is not unusual to
find that private property has been greatly injured by public
improvements, when there has been no attempt to take it for public use. The records of judicial proceedings show that private property in railroads, turnpike roads, toll bridges and ferry ways, has
often been greatly injured, and sometimes quite destroyed by acts
authorized by legislation, which, according to judicial decisions, did
not violate any provision of the constitution. Private property is
often injured by the construction and grading of highways and
railways, when no attempt has been made to change its character
from private to public property. The cases of Day vs. Stetson, 8
Greenlf. 465; Callender vs. 3farsh, 1 Pick. 418; CanalAppraisers
vs. The People, 17 Wend. 571, and Susquehanna Ganal Co. vs.
Wright, 9 Watts & Serg. 9, present examples of it.
The provision was not designed, and it cannot operate, to prevent
legislation, which should authorize acts operating directly and injuriously as well as indirectly upon private property, when no attempt
is made to appropriate it to public use. An instance of this kind
4f legislative action would be found in the case of the Commonwealth vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55, where a person was held indictable for the removal of gravel from his own land contrary to a
statute provision, which did not assume to appropriate it to public
use, or to make compensation for it.
The design appears to have been simply to declare that private
property shall not be changed to public property or transferred
from the owner to others for public use, without compensation. To
prevent the personal property of individuals from being consumed
or destroyed for public use without compensation, not to protect
such property from all injury by the construction of public improvements; not to prevent its temporary possession or use without a
destruction of it or a change of its character. It was designed
also to prevent the owner of real estate from being deprived of it,
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or of an easement in it, and to prevent any permanent change of
its character and use without compensation. While it was not designed to prevent legislation, which might authorize acts upon it
which would by common law be denominated trespasses, including
an exclusive possession for a temporary purpose, when there was
not attempt to appropriate it to public use. Such acts of legislation might be very unjust, and it may be presumed that no legislative body would make such enactments without making provision
for the compensation of injuries to private property occasioned by
its acts designed to promote the public good. The claim upon the
justice of the State might be perfect, while compensation would
not be secured by any provision of the constitution.
If this provision of the constitution does not prevent enactments.
authorizing an exclusive possession of land owned by an individual
for a temporary purpose, without compensation, when there is no
attempt to appropriate it to public use, will it operate to prevent an
exclusive occupation of it temporarily as an incipient proceeding
to the acquisition of a title to it, or to an easement in it ? Will it
prohibit legislation authorizing acts to be done, when the intention
is by them and by other means, to be adopted to secure finally a
title to the land or to hn easement in it for public use, and .allow
the same acts to be done upon the same land when done withoutany such intention? Was it the design to make the intention with.
which the act was performed, the intention to determine whether it
would or could not be authorized by the legislative department?
This leads to a further inquiry, to ascertain the sense in which.
the word "taken" was used in the constitution.
That word is used in a variety of senses, and to communicate
ideas quite different. Its sense, as used in a particular case, is to
be ascertained by the connection in which it is used, and from the
context; the whole being applied to the state of facts respecting
which it was used.
It cannot well be denied, and it is generally admitted, to have
been used in constitutions containing this clause, to require compensation to be made for private property appropriated to public
use, by the exercise on the part of the government of its superior
18
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title to all property required by the necessities of the people, to
promote their common welfare. This appears to have been denominated the right of eminent domain, of supereminent dominion, of
transcendental propriety. These terms are of importance only to
disclose the idea presented by them, that the government or sovereignty claims it by virtue of a title superior to the title of the individual; and that, by its exercise, the individual and inferior title
becomes wholly or in part extinguished; extinguished to the extent
to which the superior title is exercised. To take the real estate of
an individual for public use, is to deprive him of his title to it, or
of some part of his title, so that the entire dominion over it no
longer remains with him. He can no longer convey the entire title
and dominion.
The exclusive occupation of that estate temporarily as an initiatory proceeding to an acquisition of a title to it, or to an easement
in it, cannot amount to a taking of it in that sense. The title of
the owner is thereby in no degree extinguished. He can convey
that title thus exclusively occupied, as he could have done before.
Should he do so by a conveyance containing a covenant that it was
free of all incumbrances, that covenant would not make him liable
for such an exclusive occupation, unless it be admitted that a title
to the land can be acquired without making compensation, and this
is denied.
A construction of the provision, which would permit legislation
authorizing private property to be exclusively occupied, without
first making compensation as an incipient proceeding to the acquisition of a title to it, or to an easement in it, and which would not
authorize the title of the owner to be extinguished or impaired
without compensation, may be somewhat novel, but it will not be
found to be unsupported by positions asserted and maintained in
judicial opinions. It is generally admitted in them, that examinations and surveys may be authorized by legislative. enactments,
without a violation of the constitutional provision, and without provision for previous compensation. Where is to be found the limit
of the legislative power to authorize trespasses of a more extensive
and injurious character, which do not extinguish or entrench upon
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the title of the owner? Does that provision of the constitution
permit the legislative power to authorize trespasses not very injurious to private property, witbout providing for previous compensation, and prohibit it from authorizing those of a little more or much
more injurious character, which do not, in any degree, impair or
affect the title of the owner ? It was not the intention to make the
exercise of legislative power depond upon the extent of the injury,
whieh the authorized acts might occasion, if the title Was not
invaded.
There are cases, in which an opinion is expressed, that all injuries to private property, authorized by the legislative power, can
only be authorized by the exercise of the right of eminent domain;
and that a temporary injury or occupation amounts to a taking of
the property.
If it be admitted that such an injury or occupation of the property amounts to a taking of it in the sense in which that word is
used in the constitution, it will follow that measures must be taken
to ascertain the damages occasioned thereby, and that compensation must be dctually made before it can be injured or occupied; or
that the right to do it without compensation first made must be
admitted, leiving the party injured to the chance of obtaining compensation as he may best be able. If the former alternative be
adopted, private property cannot be injured or temporarily occupied,
however urgent and immediate may be the public necessity, without
waiting for the final completion of all proceedings to ascertain the
compensation. And how the amount of compensation can be satisfactorily ascertained before the acts occasioning damages have been
performed, it is not easy to perceive. If the latter alternative be
adopted, and the right to cause a temporary occupation or injury
be admitted, before compensation is made, the party injured must
depend upon a legislative provision for his compensation, and
the prohibitory clause of the constitution will fail to secure to
him, with entire certainty, a compensation. In other words, it
will of itself afford him no protection against such temporary
injury or occupation; and would leave him in the position in
which he would be by a construction of that clause, which would
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protect him against a permanent appropriation of his property or
an extinguishment or diminution of his title to it.
Many of the judicial opinions urgently restrictive of the legislative power, assert, that the title to land taken, or to an easement in it,
cannot be transferred from the owner to others for public use, without compensation actually made-that the acts of payment and of
transfer are simultaneous. If this be true, it is immaterial, so far
as it respects the acquisition of a title to land, or 'to an easement
in it for public use, where compensation is made. It can only be
material to insist that compensation shall be made before an exclusive occupation is permitted to prevent a temporary inconvenience
and loss. An attempt has already been made to show that such
was not the design of the prohibitory clause.
In the case of Callender vs. Harsh, 1 Pick. 480, the opinion
states that the clause "has ever been confined in judicial application to the case of property actually taken and appropriated by
the government."
In the case of ifooker vs. The .New Haven and Northampton
Co., 14 Conn. 146, Williams, C. J., says, that thQ canal being made
in the place designated, "and the damages assessed and paid, it
became a canal legally authorized, and the company became vested
with the legal right to the eejoyment of their property." And
Sherman, J., says, " that the only limitation at common law, or by
any constitution to the legislative power over individual property is,
that what is taken must be paid. for."
In the case of Bradshaw vs. Bogers, 20 John. 103, Spencer, C.
J., says, "it is true that the fee simple of the land is not vested in
the people of the State until the damages are appraised and paid ;
but the authority to enter is absolute, and does not depend on the
appraisal and payment."
In the case of Bloodgood vs. The Mohawk and .ffudson Bailroad Company, 18 Wend. 9, Maison, Senator, insists that an entry
and possession of the land taken in defiance of the rights of the
owner is a taking of it in the legal sense, and yet he admits that the
legal fee may not be in them."
In the case of Baker vs. Johnson, 2 Hill, 342, the opinion
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states, "although the absolute fee did not pass to the State
until the appraisement of damages, yet the right to enter and use
the property was perfect the moment the application was made."
It is submitted that a payment as well as an appraisement should
have been required to pass the title.
In the case of the People vs. Hayden, 6 Hill, 359, the opinion
states, "the statute places the right to have compensation made
where the principle of the constitution places it, viz. upon the
forcible divestment of the use and enjoyment of private property
for the public benefit." If the divestment intended was of a permanent character, there would be no objection made to it.
In the case of Smith vs. Hfelmer, 7 Barb, 416, the opinion
states, "it is sufficient for this case, that by the settled construction
of the constitution, which prohibits private property to be taken
for public use, without just compensation actual compensation
need not precede the appropriation."
In the case of Robottom vs. .Ttclure, 4 Blackf. 505, it was
decided, that private property might be taken for public use, upon
provision being made for a subsequent compensation.
In the case of Thompson vs. Grand Guf Railroad Company,
3 How. Missis., 240, it was decided, that compensation must be
first made, the constitution of that state requiring, that it shall not
be taken "without a just compensation first made therefor."
In the case of Pittsburgvs. Scott, 1 Penn. St. Rep. 309, it was decided, that it was not necessary that compensation should be actually
ascertained and paid before private property is appropriated to
public use. That it was, sufficient, that an adequate remedy was
provided, by which compensation could be obtained without any
unreasonable delay.
To the construction of the prohibitory clause proposed, it may
be objected, that it will not prevent the exercise of legislative
power to authorize the commission of serious injuries upon private
property, without making provision for compensation. A construction so broad as to prevent 'this, would greatly limit the legislative power and bring it within a much narrower sphere of action,
than it was accustomed to exercise without complaint, before the
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constitutions containing this clause were framed. Reliance must
be placed upon the justice of legislation and upon the administration of the laws for a recompense for such injuries, and not upon
a provision of the constitution not designed for such a purpose.
Another objection to this construction, may be, that the owner
will not be able to recover compensation for the exclusive occupation of his land, and for the injuries thereby occasioned, when the
proceedings are not so completed, and compensation made as to
transfer any title to land, or to an easement in it for public use.
This objection is believed to be founded upon an incorrect position. If compensation be not made within a reasonable time after
the land has been exclusively occupied, the right to continue that
occupation will become extinct. It being authorized only as a part
of the proceedings, permitted for the acquisition of title, when it
becomes manifest by an unreasonable delay, that the avowed purpose is not the real one, or that if real it has been abandoned, the
measures permitted for that purpose will no longer be authorized;
and if the occupation be continued after that time, the occupants
will be trespassers, and liable to be prosecuted as such. The
damages occasioned before the right of exclusive occupation became extinct, may be recovered by an action of trespass or by an
action on the case, containing in the declaration averments, that
an exclusive occupation was authorized for the purpose of acquiring title for public use, and that no such proceedings have taken
place as would transfer any title, within a reasonable time, with
other suitable averments. If the occupants should be regarded as
trespassers, ab initio, it would not be, as has been supposed, because
they had omitted to make compensation, but because they had continued to occupy or commit trespasses after it had become manifest, that their avowed was not their real purpose, or after their
real purpose had been abandoned.
It is not necessary to decide whether such an action could be
maintained; for the distinction between the action of trespass and
case has been abolished in this state.
After some difference of opipion, it may be regarded as settled,
that enactments which authorize private property to be taken for
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public use, must provide the means or course to be pursued, to have
compensation made for it.
The conclusions to which this decision leads are1. The clause in constitutions, which prohibits the taking of private property for public use, was not designed to operate, and it
does not operate to prohibit the legislative department from authorizing an exclusive occupation of private property temporarily as
an incipient proceeding to the acquisition of a title to it, or to ajL
easement in it.
2. It was designed to operate, and it does operate to prevent the
acquisition of any title to land, or to an easement in it, or to a permanent appropriation of it from an owner for public use, without
the actual payment or tender of a just compensation for it.
3. That the right to such temporary occupation as an incipient
proceeding, will become extinct by an unreasonable delay to perfect
proceedings, including the actual payment or tender of compensation, to acquire a title to the land, or to an easement in it.
4. That an action of trespass qua. cla. may be maintained to
recover damages for the continuance of such occupation, unless
compensation, or a tender of it, be made within a reasonable time
after the commencement of it.
5. That -nder such circumstances, an action of trespass, or an
action on the case may be maintained to recover damages for all
the injuries occasioned by the prior occupation. In this case, as
no compensation or tender of it was made to the plaintiff within a
reasonable time after his estate was occupied by the corporation,
no title to it, or to an easement in it, has been acquired, and the
occupation, although legally commenced, has ceased to be legal.
As the corporation acquired no title to the land, or to an easement in it, the defendant could acquire none by his conveyance
from that corporation.
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Supreme Court of Connecticut, July Term, 1852.
IN RE, HENRY WHITE, TRUSTEE.
1. A bequest to trustees of a certain sum of money to be expended by them "for
the support of indigent pious young men preparing for the ministry in New
Haven," is void for uncertainty.
2. The doctrine of cypres is not recognised in Connecticut.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
C
cuRCH,
CH. J.-The late Judge Hitchcock, Professor of law in
Yale College, drew up and executed his last Will and Testament,
containing several bequests and directions, some of which were so
vague and uncertain, that his executor and trustee under the Will
has applied to this Court for its direction in the management of the
trust committed to him.
A late writer on the law of devises has remarked that gentlemen
of the legal profession should not venture to draw up their own
wills, as many such have been of the most difficult interpretation,
and the subjects of protracted litigation. The propriety of this
suggestion is in some degree verified in this case.
Among other bequests was the following: "Any surplus income
that may remain, to the extent of one thousand dollars per annum,
I direct to be expended by my said trustees for the support of indigent pious young men preparing for the ministry in New Haven."
All the parties who, on this record, make claim under this Will,
unite in saying that this bequest is void for uncertainty; and such
is our opinion.
This legacy is not given to any college, theological institute, nor
to any association of persons corporate or voluntary, by which the
charity can be dispensed; but only as a legal interest to trustees,
to be expended or disbursed for the support of individuals, cestui
que trusts, each of whom falling within the description named has
a beneficial interest in the fund, and which he must have a right to
enforce, if any one can. The difficulty of carrying this provision
into effect is as great as if no trustee had been appointed, for no
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rule of determination, selection or apportionment is furnished by
the Will, and no positive or discretionary power of determination
bestowed. The only authority given by the language of the Will to
the trustees is, to expend the money upon the beneficiaries when
they shall be identified. We can infer no other authority from the
facts alleged and found, without substituting conjecture in the place
of interpretation and judgment.
There is a class of cases, the authority of which we recognize,
where the beneficiaries under a charitable provision are left uncertain, and the bequest sustained; but these have been where the gift
has been to some corporate or voluntary association, whose duty it
becomes to dispense the charity, or where a power is conferred upon
the trustee, executor, &c., to discriminate and select.
There may be other cases in this country, and there certainly
are in England, in which charities more equivocal and uncertain
than this have been sustained; but this has been done, we believe,
either avowedly, or at least under the influence of the doctrine of
c /pres; but we repel the authority of such cases, as we have not
adopted that principle into our system of jurispfudence.
By the theory of the English Constitution and laws, the King is
parens patrio, the guardian of infants and the dispenser of charities; and his Chancellor, as the keeper of his conscience, acts in
his stead. The doctrine of ey pres is a doctrine of prerogative,
and it seems to be this, that if it can be seen that a charity was
intended by a testator, but the object specified cannot be accomplished, the funds may be applied to other charitable purposes, not
specified. The English judges have expressed their fears of the
tendency of this power. Prudenellvs. Biwes, 1 East, 451. Lord
Eldon, in 7 Yes. 899, says, it is not proper to extend it one step
further; and our statute regarding gifts to charitable and pious
uses, declares that they shall ever remain to the uses to which they
have been or shall be given or granted, according to the true
intent and meaning of the grantor, and to no other use whatever.
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.Maryland Court of Appeals.
ALBERT AND

.December, 1852.

WIFE v8. THE CITY OF BALTIMORE AND

THE SAVINGS

BANK OF BALTIMORE.
1. T. J. directed his executors by his will, to purchase $6,3Q0 of six per cent. stock
of the City of Baltimore, which he ordered to bc set apart and held by S. J., Jr.,
and A. D. J. as trustees, in

trust for his daughter, E. J. A.

This stock was

accordingly purchased by S. J., Jr., and A. D. J. as executors, and transferred to
themselves as trustees, by the proper officer of the City, on the 10th December,
1841, and, at the same time, they directed the interest to be paid to E. J. A., or
On the 16th of October, 1845,
her order, until the power should be withdrawn
the trustees transferred this stock to the Savings Bank of Baltimore, and thereupon the Bank loaned money to S. J. Jr., in his individual name, who subsequently became insolvent, the other trustee having died; held, that from this state of
facts there did not arise such knowledge on the part of the City of Baltimore of
the designs of S. J., Jr., or such neglect on the'part of its officers, as to render
the City liable for the trustees' misapplication of their cestui que trust property.
2. Where, by the terms of its charter, a corporation is prohibited from loaning any
part of the funds deposited to a director, such loan, if made, cannot be recovered,
Nor can the provision of the charter be
and any security taken for it is void.
evaded, by borrowing in the name of a stranger, where the director is really, and
But this doctrine does not
is known to be the person borrowing the money.
extend to any other corporation borrowing, whereof a director chances to be a
stockholder.
3. It is no answer, on the part of the Savings Bank, that the loan of the money and
the hypothecation of the stock by A. D. J., is an executed contract

A. D. J.

might be estopped from denying its legality, but it is otherwise with his cestui gue
trust.

This was an appeal from the Court of Chancery, and the opinion
of this Court, which fully discloses the facts, was delivered by
LE GRAND, CII. J.-It appears from the proceedings in this
case, that Talbot Jones, a citizen of Baltimore, in the year 1834
died, seized and possessed of a considerable estate; that he made a
will, and appointed his two sons, Samuel and Andrew D. Jones, as
his executors; and that among the objects of his bounty was his
.daughter Emily, one of the complainants.
The bill states that, by virtue of a decree of the High Court of
Chancery, passed on the 6th November, 1841, in a suit instituted
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to procure a division of the residuary estate of Talbot Jones among
the legatees designated in his will, it was ordered that $6,300 of
six per cent. stock of the City of Baltimore should be set apart,
and held by Samuel Jones, Jr., and Andrew D. Jones as trustees,
in trust for the sole and separate use of Emily J. Albert.
The bill alleges that this decree was made known to the proper
officer of the corporation of Baltimore City; and, in pursuance of
said decree, the stock was entered on the City's books in the name
of Samuel and Andrew D. Jones, as trustees, and so remained until
the 16th of October, 1845, when the trustees transferred it to the
Savings Bank of Baltimore; that, at the time of the transfer, the
Bank knew the stock stood on the books of the City in the name of
Samuel and Andrew D. Jones, as trustees, and if any consideration
passed for the transfer, it was a loan made by the Bank of part of
its deposits to Samuel Jones, in his individual name, or by his mercantile style of Talbot Jones & Co., which was known to the Bank
to be his mercantile style, and it was also aware that he had no
partner in the business carried on in the name of Talbot Jones &
Co. It charges that, at the time of the loans, Jones, to whom they
were made, was a director in the Savings Bank, and that they were
made in violation of its charter, which prohibits loans to any of its
directors. The death of Andrew, and the insolvency of Samuel
Jones is alleged, and decree prayed, entitling the surviving trustee
to $6,300 of six per cent. City stock, for the use of the complainant,
Emily J. Albert; that the transfer to the Savings Bank be declared
void, and to pass no title; and the City and Bank be decreed to
refund all the dividends that may have accrued on the stock since
the 16th October, 1845.
Both the City and the Bank deny all knowledge of the contents
of the will of Talbot Jones, and of the decree of the Court of Chancery, and the Bank, in addition, denies all knowledge of the fact,
that Samuel Jones traded without a partner, under the style and
name of Talbot Jones & Co.
The above summary of the principal averments of the bill and
answers, is sufficiently full to present the questions this Court is
called upon to consider and decide.
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It. appears from the proceedings that the stock, which is the subject of the controversy, did not belong to the estate of Talbo" Jones
at the time of his decease, but that it was subsequently purchased
by the executors, and stood on the City books in their name as
such, until it was transferred by them as executors to themselves
as trustees. On the 10th of December, 1841, Samuel Jones and
Andrew D. Jones, as executors, authorized Emily J. Albert, or
order, to draw the interest on the stock standing in their names as
trustees, until the power should be withdrawn, and, on the same
day, she directed the same to be paid to her husband, one of the
complainants.
On this state of facts, it is contended, the City is responsible for
the misapplication of the private estate of Mrs. Albert. This supposition rests on the hypothesis that the decree of the 6th of November, 1841, by force of the act of 1785, chapter 72, section 13,
was notice to the City of the will of Talbot Jones, and the interests
of cestui que trust under it as ascertained by the decree, or, on
the idea that as the stock originally stood upon the books in the
names of Andrew and Samuel Jones, as executors, the City was,
by force of that fact, affected with notice of the Will and of the
cestui que trusts named in it, and that the transfer of the 16th of
October, 1845, to which it assented, was a breach of trust. We are
of opinion that the section of the act of 1785 is not available in
this case for the purpose for which it has been cited.
In support of the proposition that the City-is responsible for the
misappropriation of the stock by Samuel Jones, the counsel for
the appellants cited many authorities. We do not deem it necessary to enter into an examination of them, because the principles
which they announce have been very clearly evolved by the learned
Chief Justice of the United States in an opinion pronounced by
him in a case in many particulars like the one now before this Court.
We allude to the decision in the case of Lowry vs. The Commercial
and Farmers' Bank of Baltimore, and others, to be found reported
in the 3d vol. of the Bankers' Magazine, page 201.
The principles recognized by the Court in that case seem to us
to be founded in sound policy and fully sustained by the authorities,
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and we therefore adopt them, so far as they are applicable to the
case before us.
It was a case growing out of a breach of trust on the part of
an executor; the will and executor being the same to which reference is had in this suit. In that case a certain number of shares
of bank stock belonging to the estate of Talbot Jones were transferred by the executor, Samuel Jones, to another bank, as security
for a loan which he had procured for his own use.
The learned Court held the particular circumstances of that case
sufficient to affect the bank on whose books the stock stood, with
all the consequences of notice of the trust, and therefore, whilst
the transferree took a good title, the bank, through the negligence
of whose officers the fraud was permitted to be perpetrated, was
held responsible for the misapplication of the stock,
In the case before us, however, we are unable to perceive any
circumstances which affect the city with such notice of the trust,
or with the purposes of Jones, on making the transfer so as to render it liable to a decree for restitution.
In the case to which we have already referred, the Court says:"Undoubtedly the mere act of permitting this stock to be transferred by one of the executors furnishes no ground for complaint
against the bank, although it turns out that this executor was by
this act of transfer converting the property to his own use. For
an executor may sell or raise money on the property of the deceased in the regular execution of his duty, and the party dealing
with him is not bound to inquire into his object, nor liable for his
misapplication of the money. Such is the doctrine in the English
courts, and would seem to have been the law of this State, previous
to the Act of Assembly of December session, 1843, ch. 304, and
the transaction now before us took place before that act went into
operation. But it is equally clear that if a party dealing with an
executor has at the time reasonable ground for believing that he
intended to misapply the money, or is in the very transaction of
applying it to his own private use, the party so dealing is responsible to the persons injured. For this doctrine the court refer to
the cases collected and commented on in the cases of McLeod vs.
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-Drummond,17 Vesey, 132, and _Fields vs. Tchuaffalem, 7 Johns.
Ch. Rep. 150.
These being the principles which must govern the decision of the
question as to the liability of the city, the next inquiry is, Are there
any circumstances in the case before us which furnish reasonable
ground to the officer of the city to suspect that Jones was about to
commic a breach of trust by appropriating the city stock to his own
private use ?
If any exist, they are to be found in the record entries; and they
are that the stock once was in the name of Samuel and Andrew
Jones, as executors, and afterwards by their act transferred to them
as trustees; these, in connection -with the privileges to Mrs. Albeit
to draw the dividends until the authority should be withdrawn, constitute all the facts on which the presumption of reasonable grounds
for knowledge or suspicion of the purposes of Jones can be placed.
We think them wholly inadequate to sustain the theory of the appellant. The register of the city-the officer charged with the
custody of the records of the public stock of the city-expressly
declares he had no knowledge that the transfer of the stock was
made to the two" Jones' as trustees, because of a decree of the
Court of Chancery, and that it was and had been the uniform practice of the office to transfer stock standing in the name of trustees
on the endorsement of such trustees.
We have seen that the mere act of permitting the executors to
transfer the stock could furnish no ground of complaint against
the city, and the question thercfore is " Could any arise out of the
mere act of allowing the trustees to transfer." The same doctrine
is applicable to both cases, for there is no difference, in principle,
between them. We attach no importance to the authority given
to Mrs. Albert to take the dividends. By its very terms it was revocable at the pleasure of the parties who gave it. And the authority to her to take the dividends was as well calculated to arouse the
suspicions of the register of the city as to its propriety as the transfer to the Savings Bank, to suggest the intention of Jones to apply
the stock to his own uses. The mere designation of the parties as
trustees, without a specification of trust, or designation of the ce8tui
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que trust, could not possibly give the city officer any information;
and had he made inquiry in regard to the object and purposes of
Aae trust, there "i no one to whom he could with propriety apply
but to the trustees themselves, for the entry on his books gave him
no clue whatever. A reference to the will of Talbot Jones would
have given no information on the subject, for it was silent in regard
to the particular stock in question; in fact, it was purchased by
the executors subsequently to his death. For these. reasons we
concur in opinion with the Chancellor, that there was not such
knowledge on the part of the city of the designs of Samuel Jones,
or such neglect of duty on the part of the officers as to make it
liable to restore the stock or its equivalent in value.
The next question is as to the responsibility of the Savings Bank.
Independently of the provisions of its charter, we are clear in the
opinion, the circumstances under which it obtained the stock would
have given it a perfect title. As is very justly remarked by the
Court, in the case of Lowry vs. The CommerciaZ Bank, "a transfer of stock cannot be likened to an ordinary conveyance of real or
personal property. The instrument transferring the title is not
delivered to the party. * * * The party to whom it is transferred
rarely, if ever, sees the entry, and relies altogether upon the certificate of the proper officer stating that he is entitled to so many
shares." In the case before the Court the bank denies explicitly
all knowledge of the trust, and there was nothing in the manner of
the transfer different from the usual course of proceeding in such
transactions, which are of hourly occurrence in a large commercial
city like Baltimore, where stocks are the subjects of sale and of
hypothecation.
But the real difficulty in the case of the bank grows out of its
charter. The second section of the act of 1818, chapter 93, provides, that the "1Corporation shall not be authorized to make any
bills or notes in the nature or description of bank notes, or to loan
any part of the funds deposited to any directorof said corporation."
At the time of the loans to Samuel Jones by the bank and the
hypothecation, by him, of the city stock, he was a director of the
Bank; and the question arises, whether the transactions had with
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him touching the stock in question, vested in the Corporation, under'
its charter, any title to the stock.
It cannot be denied that a loan to a director could, not be recovered, the Bank having no power to make it, such loan, p.n4 any
security taken for it would be void, 3 Wendall, 574, But it is said
the loans were not made to a director, but to a firm of which he
was a member, and that, to give such a construction to the charter
of the Bank as would inhibit it from loaning any portion of its
deposits to a company of which one of its directors might chance
to be a member, wouM be productive of consequences of an alarming character. However this may be, we do not feel ourselves
called upon to disregard what we conceive to be the clearly expressed purpose of the Legislature. Its policy in this particular
is as much the law for our government as it is for that of the corporation which is the creature of its power. We cannot disguise from
ourselves, the manifest purpose of the Legislature to prevent any
of the directors of the bank from applying to their use its deposits,
and if we were to sanction the doctrine, that any director could
avail himself of the advantages of loans by procuring them in the
name of a firm instead of his individual name, we should defeat the
very object which the Legislature had in view when it authorized
the establishment of the Bank. No better case could be adduced
to show the unsoundness of the construction contended for on behalf
of the Bank than the one now before the Court. It is admitted on
all sides that Samuel Jones, as such, could not under the charter
of the Bank, obtain a loan of any of its deposits, and yet, if the
views of counsel be correct, he could obtain it by applying for the
loan under a name different from his own, bat which, at the time
of his application should be known to indicate a commercial house
of which he was a partner, if not the only one constituting it.
Such a state of things cannot receive the sanction of a Court of
Justice, whose duty it is to effectuate the purposes of the Legislature and not to thwart them. But, it is urged, such a construction
as we have given to the charter, would render void any loan which
might be made by the Bank to a corporation of which one of its
directors might be a stockholder. Such a consequence by no means
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follows from hat we have said. The distinceL between a private
mecantile firm and a corporation, is obvious, and exists in this
that Ahen a person becomes a partner n the transactions of commercial bfisiness, hedoes'not lose his individuality, 'whilst lie does,
so far as tfte transactions of the corporation are concerned, when he
becofal's a stockholder. "A corporation," says Chancellor Kent,
2 vbi.."Com. 266, "is a. franchise possessed by one or more individuals'who iibsisBt abody politic, under' a special denomination,
arid are vested, by the policy of the law, with the capacity of perpetuAl suession, and of adting in several'respects, however numerous the assdeiation may be, as a single individual."
B~it, it-is urged, that conceding the bank had no power, under
its charter, to make the loans fo Samuel Jones, and to receive as
security for tlie same, an hypothecation of the stock, yet inismuch
as the contract has been executed,"it is now too late to object. -To
this reasoning we cannot ssent. It is true, Jones might be estopped from denying the legality of. the transaction, but it does-not
therefore follow hat the rights'of"his ces(ui que trust are also concliid'ed

it 'has been "one' .

" "

*If what thd Bank did, was illegal, no valid defence can be deduced
from it against the party who has been injured' by its acts. The
Bank oaght to have known, and the law'mpites such knowledge to
making the contract, that i was'xc.ti Ag in violation
it, leni
of its Iarter ; a'nd, if an injury accrued to a third paiy from its
aetW3in justice it should be held'liable. Any other iew. would
sandronthe'doctifie that a creature of the law, with- bit limited
powers, by 'an usurpation "ofpower, and'-in -defiance. -of,the plain
inhibition of the Legislature, may. enable -a fraudulent -erson to
dispose 6f the property of a tkird person, withoutbeink ahnwerable
fo& so doing. '-Wha tJones did was A wrong on the- rights of theappellants ; And if the Bank, in contempt-of tt .iiitation -itposed.
up it by its chazii4 ed him in'the perp trtiion of the fraud,.
4od
there is, no reaso6ithir of Ublic policy, or in: law, -which
exemptit from"L k onuibility' for the injury occasiohed by ita--vopeiation. To announde'any other doctrine, -wodild be t4 _iojaim
h perfect immunity to the Bank to assist in the infliction 'of "wr'ng,
19

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

provided all knowledge of its authorized acts be kept from the party
to be injured until the injustice should be complete. We hold, that
a corporation has no power to do what it is inhibited by its charter
from doing; and if, in 'violation of it, injury should be done.to the
property of a thirdparty, it is liable. There can be no hardship in
such a rule ; all that is necessary for it to do to avoid liability, is to
confine itself 'within the limits prescribed by law, which gives it
existence and defines and regulates the extent and exercise of its
delegated powers. We concur with the Chancellor in opinion in so
far as his decree has reference to the City of Baltimore, but dissent
from that portion of it which exempts the Savings Bank from liability
to complainants for the amount -of the stock sold. We will sign a
decree in conformity with these vieWs.
Bill dismissed as to the City of Baltimore, and decree reversed
so far as the Savings Bank is concerned.

Louisville Chancery Court, . Kentucky, January, 1853.
SECOMtN,

VOORIIIES & CO.

VS. JONES WADE.

1. Where J. W. purchased certain merchandise at Wilmington, N. C., and shipped
it on board a vessel bound to New Orleans, consigned to M. & R., to be forwarded to J. W., at Cincinnati, with instructions to M. & R. to sell it at a
certain price: and thereupon a portion is sold and a portion remaes unsold
and continues its transit, the latter is still subject .to the vTndor's right of stoppage in tranmitu, the middle man having no such possession as to end the transit.
2. An effort to sell or a sale of part of goods consigned to a forwarding merchant,
in obedience to instructions, is not such a change of the destination or possession of the whole as to lestroy the vendor's right in trrn ftu.
3. Goods in transit stopped by a general creditor are still subjected to the vendor's
claim for the purchase miney.

This was an attachment sued out by the complainants, creditors of
Wade, against a large amount of property passing by the City of
'louisville from New Orleans to the defendant at Cincinnati.
In' February, 1852, Wade bought of Henry Nutt, on credit, at
Wilmington, North Carolina, a large quantity of spirits of turpen-
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tine, rice, tar, rosin and pitch, which was shipped by his order,
"on board the Brig Frontier, bound to New Orleans, and consigned
arsh & Rqn.ett, to be forwarded to Mir.' S. Jones
to Xlessrs.
Wade, of Cincinnati." Wade advised the house of Marsh & Ranlett
of the shipment, aiid instructed them, if they could sell at a certain
price to do so; and they did accordingly sell one hundred barrels
of. the spirits of turpentin . The residue, still a large amount, they
forwarded in, different boais destined to Cincinnati. Several thousand dollars worth.of the property was seized by the attachment.
Henry Ntt;,by his i'etition, asked to be made a party to this
suit,'which was ordered; and he claims the right of the vendor as
if he had stopped the goods iii transitu, Wade having becomeinsolvent.
The destination of the property was fixed by the bill of lading,
to Cincinnati.
The.6pinien of the Court was aelivered by
PI.RTLE, Cu.- The doctrine of stpppage in transituwas, perhaps,
unknown to the old common law. It was introduced by the Court
Pf Chancery, first, as far as.we know, in the time of Will. 3d, and
afterwards the Courts of law took it up, axid between the Courts of
lw-and.equity, the rule; as we have it now, was ultimately established, but not without considerable differenae of opinion.
By, the Civil Law, the right of the vendor to pursue the property
sold where the purchase nioney was not paid, and subject it to payment of his debt in preference to other creditors, on insolvency, extended to cases where the possession had actually been had by the
vendee. TheFrench law-was about the same. With these codes before
te Courts of law and equity in England, claiming the attention of
jurists in all lands, the rule was established which has come to us.
The regard to a more extended commerce, did not allow these Courts
tQ afford the right of lien as given substantially in the Civil Law
And the French Law; because the rights of creditors and purcbasers
from the vendee, who saw the property in his possession, were not
deemed sufficiently guarded by this rule. But the right to stop'the
goods sold in transitu was fixed in these Courts; and no doubt the
design was to allow the right of the vendor .as far as would be
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consistent with'a due'*regard for the exigen es of commerce, and
the free disposition of property. Such would seem to be the true
and just rule. The remedy is restricted enough ;"I Would rather
advance it than take one step backwards. It seeing to every bne,
at first thought, that tlc vendor has, while the goods bought have
not come to the general stock of the vendaee,'a betterright than any
other to be satisfed out of the property sold. on.credit. But the
Courts haye not extended the right of the vendor further than to
stop the goods before they have come to *the actual.br constructive
possession of the vendee; that is to say, while they are really and
in commercial view, in transitu. It seems to nie that the effect
given to a constructive possession is often unnecessarily injurious
to the vendor.
Lord Hardwicke's rule was to .allow the vendor's right where
there was no"appearance of credit on the goods or money paid on
them. D'Aquila vs. Lambert, Ambler Rep. 400. However, where
the transitus ends, is the question.
The designation of a carrier or forwarding merchant, by the
vendee, or, generally, apy order lie may give as to the hands through
which they shall pass, has not been held to affect the right of the
vendor. Should he have them ordered to a merchant, to be sent by
him to other marketsas the vendee might thereafter order, or to
be sent by this merchant as in his discretion, as agent of the e'dee,
he might deem. best, the*transit would be determined. .Dixonvs.
Baldwin, 5 East. 17. This ii the end 6f the'destination, fixed at
the time of the purchase.
But where the passage of the goods does actually go on, acdording to the bill of laling, altho'ugh other things with regard to them
may be provisionally ordered, by the vendee, this shall not affect
the vendor's right. Why should such an ordei affect him ? The
prbperty.is in the vende.e when it is delivered to the ship; but thia
.does noV affect the venaor's right to save his purchase-money. Why
should -an order to sell do so, where it is conditional, as in this case,
ard the goods are to pass on;. if the price fixed cannot be obtained ?
This is. no more than if the vendee had ordered the forwarding merchant to hold the goods until there should come a good stage of
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waterin the great rivers, or until a boat be.longing to the port of
Cincinnati should be found to carry them. ' This :might be for.
months, but still, all merchants would deem them to be on transit
according to the original bill of lading. The middleman has no
possession t6 end the transit any more than the carrier, although
the goods may abide with him long. ft the carrier'were instructed
to sell, if he could. get a,certain price, if not, to carry 6n the goods,
he would still be a carrier only, unless he sold them; and the goods
inevery practical sense.
would still be inpassing..
That Marsh and .Ranlett sold some 'of the, property can make no
difference. They passed on what they did not sell pursuant to the
bill of lading, signed at Wilmington.I do not find any adjudged cas6 precisely like this, where an
order hkad been rpade by the vbndee to sell a part, or tht whole,and this order might well ibaae extended to the whole, according to
the proof; but I do not- think public policy should make such an
order change the.rule, and plain justice to the vendor forbids the
change.
Indeed, there is much more danger in xestraining the right of
the vendor, than in enlarging it. The goods are generally, indeed
universally, marked in the usual mercantiHe way, showing the destination of tie shipment; and the exceptions to this open destinat;.on,
which is-also further shown by the original bill of lading, should be
distinct and clear. This, it seems to me,, would be the better -rule"
in our American commerce. Surely there are rieasons why our
trade, passing from State to State, should be more liberal than it is
in Europe, where there is not one. language, and, bie habit of
business.
In Jones vs. Jones, 8 Mees. & Wels. -44i; the bounsel rgued
thus: "With respect to the taking of s a'ples, 'no .dobt if it had
been done with the intention to take possession of the vhole cargo,
the tansitus would have been determined thereby: but hereit was
done solely with a view to a sale of so much as the plaintiff might'
be able to dispose of at Barmouth, leaving the remainder to proceed&
to the end of the voyage." The courit, iire'sponding to the argument, said: "'The taking of samples is an equivocal act; itmighbt
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be that he took them in order to ascertain whether he could Aspose
of any part of the goods there, without intending thereby to take
actual possession," before the original transitus was ended.
.Now, in this case, will the effort to sell by the forwarding merchants, or the sale of part, change the destination of all from Wade
at Cincinnati to the house of Marsh & Ranlett at New Orleans?
In the case of Whzitehead vs. Anderson, 9 Mees. & Wels. 534,
the court said, "A case of constructive possession is where the
carrier enters expressly, or by implication, into a new agreement,
distinct from the original contract for carrying, to hold the goods
for the consignee as his agent, not for the purpose of expediting
them to the place of original destination, pursuant to the contract,
but in a new character, for the purpose of custody on his account,
and subject to some new or further order to be given him."
It is plain to me, that the ijierchants at New Orleans did hold
the goods only for the purpose of expediting themi on their voyage
from Wilmington to Cincinnati, as they did not sell them for the
price fixed.
As to the effect of the attachment on the right of Henry Nutt,
it is a matter ruled without any contradiction. If the goods in
transit are stopped by legal process of a general creditor, the vendor
-may assert his right to subject them to his debt for the purchase
money; and this is equivalent to the stoppage in transitu by himself; and he will have the preference over the legal process, although
but for the suit that stopped them, they would have fallen into the
hands of the vendee. Buckley vs..Furniss 15 Wend Rep. 137;
Nay or vs. Dennie, 8 Pick. Rep. 198; Sawyer vs. 'Joslin,20 Vermont Rep. 172; Oovell vs. Hfitchcock, 23 Wend. Rep. 611; Bause
" Son vs. Judson, 4 Dana, 11.

Henry Nutt must be paid first, out of the money in court, except
that the costs of the complainants must be taken out of his share.
Judgment accordingly.
NoTu.-The delivery of part of the goods sold, under one entire contract, to the
purchaser, without any intention on the part of the seller to retain the rest, is
deemed a delivery of the whole; but this rule is confined to cases, where the delivery
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of part is intended to be a delivery of the whole; but this may be rebutted, and, if
so, the right of stoppage may continue as to the residue undelivered ; Abb. on Shipp.
325, 7th ed. See also Chitty on Contr. 433, text and Peikins's Notes, 5th ed; Miles
v. Gorton, 2 Cromp. & Mees. 508, and Am. Ed.'s Note; Burney v. Poyntz, 4 B. &
Ad. 568; Betts v. Gibbins, 4 N, & Man. 64 S. C., 2 Ad.'& Ellis, 57. Story's Contr.
I 823, 2d ed.; Tanner v..Scorill, 14 Mees. & Wels. 28, Smith on Contr. 451. Rawle's
ed. 1853, 3 Kent Comm. 545, Notes, 7th ed; Valpy v. Gibson, 4 Mann. Gr. & Sc.
837.

Court of Appeal8 of Kentucky, January, 1853.
FERRY VS. STREET.
1. A slave carried into Pennsylvania, with her owner's consent, and residing in that
State for a period of more than six months, with a full knowledge on the pa7t of
the owner, of the Pennsylvania Act of 1780, is entitled to her freedom.
2. Such law operates perinanently upon the rights of strangers, where they are
informed of its provisions, and may, if they choose, avoid its consequences.

The facts fully appear in the opinion of the Court, which was
delivered by CRnSHAW, J.
In the spring of the year 1838, Clarissa, a woman of color, the
property of Mrs. Trigg, at the instance of her mistress, accompanied
Mrs. Alexander to the city of Philadelphia. The object of Mrs.
Alexander in visiting this city, was to consult physicians there upon
the subject of her eyes, which were much diseased, and, if necessary
and advisable, to place herself under their treatment.
irs. Alexander, being a near relative of Mrs. Trigg, being in a very helpless
condition in consequence of defective sight, and Clarissa being a
very faithful and trustworthy servant, Mrs. Trigg determined to
send Clarissa with Mrs. Alexander to Philadelphia, to take care of
and wait upon her. But, before they departed on their journey,
Mrs. Trigg sent for Jeptha Dudley to consult him in regard to the
laws of Pennsylvania, and what effect they might have upon slaves
sent by their owners into that State. Dudley visited Mrs. Trigg
according to her bequest, and informed her that he was no lawyer,
but his impression was, that if Clarissa should remain in Pennsylvania as long as six months she would be entitled to her freedom.
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Mrs. Trigg, as Dudley states, then said that she had no calculation
that Mrs. Alexander would return in less than a year, and she
intended to send Clarissa with her to remain until Mrs. Alexander's
return, lecause she could not trust Mrs. Alexander with any other
person; that she did not believe Clarissa would avail herself ot the
laws of Pennsylvania, because she had a husband and children in
Kentucky, and because Clarissa knew that she was to be free at
her (Mrs. Trigg's) death; that Clarissa having been the patient
and attentive nurse of Major Trigg in his last illness, he desired
her and her child to be purchased by Mrs. Trigg, ana liberated at
her death, and that she had promised to do so.
Mrs. Alexander an Clarissa departed for Philadelphia, and
Clarissa remained there more than six months. She then returned
to Kentucky, according to the united wish of herself and Mrs. 'Trigg,
and went again into her service. After this, Mrs. Trigg having
occasion to borrow a sum of money from Miss "Thompson (now Mrs.
Ferry), her adopted daughter, who seems to have resided with her,
executed to her an absolute bill of sale for Clarissa. Dudley states,
that, notwithstanding the absolute character of the bill of sale, it
was intended only as an evidence to Miss Thompson of the debt,
and to secu're her in its payment; and that, before Mrs. Trigg's
death she enjoined on him, who was to be her executor, to raise the
means from her estate and discharge the debt to Miss Thompson,
that Clarissa might be free. Mrs. Trigg made her will, liberating
her other slaves, and making Miss Thompson her devisee. And
Dudley says he,would soon have raised the means from the hire of
the other negroes to redeem Clarissa had it not been for the interposition of Miss Thompson, who desired the liberated slaves tQ be
discharged from further service. Although Miss Thompson was the
devisee of Mrs. Trigg, the amount of property realized by her from
the estate does not appear to have been sufficient to discharge the
debt to Miss Thompson of $500, which constituted the consideration
of the bill of sale to her of Clarissa. It is proved that Miss Thompson was cognizant of the desire and intent of Mrs. Trigg to liberate
Clarissa. But, the only ground upon which Clarissa bases her right
to freedom, necessary to be considered, is her remaining in Penn-
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sylvania more than six months when she accompanied Mrs. Alexander to Philadelphia.
There is some discrepancy, in the testimony in regard to the
time which Mrs. Trigg expected Clarissa to remain in Philadelphia
-with Mrs. Alexander, and as to her willingness for her to remain as
long as six months; but we think the proof establishes the fact, not
only that the expected Clarissa to remain as much as six months,
but that she -Was willig for her so to remain. Clarissa, then,
was not only sent to Pennsylvaia by Mrs. Trigg, but remained
there with her consent and approbation for the period of six months
and longer, with a knowledge, on her part, of the laws of that State
upon the subject of slaves remaining there longer than six months.
Aid the question is, do these facts entitle Clarissa to her freedom,
to obtain which she has instituted this suit against Ferry and his
wife, who was the late Miss Thompson, to whom the bill of,sale mentioned was executed:?
The statute of Pennsylvania, upon which Clarissa relies, as conferring freedom upon her, 'was passed in the year 1780 ; and the
10th section of that act, being the .one relied upon, is in the following words:
"And be it further enacted, that no man or voman of any nation
or color, except the. negroes or *mulattoes who shall be registered as
aforesaid, shall, at any time hereafter, be deemed, adjudged or
holden, within the!'territories of this Commonwealth, as slasves or
servants foi life, but as free men and free women; except the
domestic slaves attending upon delegates in Congress from the
. other American states, foreign ministers and consuls, and persons
passing through or sojourning in this State, and not becoming residents therein, and seamen employed in ships not belonging to any
inhabitants of this State, nor employed in any ship owned by any
such inhabitant; provided such domestic .slaves be-not aliened or
sold to any inhabitant, nor (except in The case of.,members of Congresu, foreign ministers and consuls) retained in -this State longer

than six months."
I _k .. - ,
"
-.
Notwithstanding the many sui's which have been brought to this
Court, prosecuted by persons of 6olor to bbtain their- freedom, the
'
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precise question involved in this controversy has not been decided.
It has been repeatedly held by this Court, that a slave, sent or permitted to go to a state where slavery is not tolerated, for a temporary purpose only, does not thereby acquire a right to freedom in
Kentucky; but that, whatever might be his status or condition in
the free state to which he had been sent or carried, not for residence, but for a merely temporary purpose, his condiion as a
slave, upon his return to Kentucky, would not be changed. Bankin vs. Lydia, 2 Mar. 476 ; Bu8h'8 Bepreeentatives vs. White, 8
Mon. 104; Graham vs. Strader, 5 B. Mon. 179; Tom .DaviR.vs.
Tingle, 8 B. Mon. 546-7; Collin8, fc. vs. America, 9 B. Mon. 565:
Maria vs. Kirby, 12 B. Mon. 542. In these cases the effect of
the laws of other states, where slavery is not recognized at all, not
even for a moment, was discussed and considered, and the consequence of a temporary or transient sojourn merely in such States,
by the consent or approbation of the owner, was declared to be,
not that the slave thereby became entitled to freedom in this State,
but that, upon his return here, his condition should be as it was
before such temporary sojourn--that of a slave.
But the question, whether a slave taken to a state where, although
the inhabitants, whether black or white, are free, a privilege is
extended to sojourners who come from slave states to hold their
servants as slaves until a particular period, beyond which they are
not allowed to do so, has not been decided. Or, in other words, if
a state, into which a slave is voluntarily sent or carried by the
owner, though for a temporary purpose only, has declared by statute that a slave remaining there a certain length of time shall be
free, this Court has not decided what shall be the effect or operation
of such a law upon the condition of a person of color who may, in
our courts, claim to be free by virtue of such a statute. This question has been expressly left open. This Court, in the case of
Maria vs. Xirby, supra, say: "If any state were to enact that
any slave brought within its limits by the authority of the owner,
and permitted by him to remain there six months, or three, or ev.n
one, should be free, there .might be some reason for saying that such
a law should operate permanently, even upon the rights of strangers,
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because they would have an opportunity of knowing its provisions
and avoiding its consequences-." "And in the case of Collin8 vs.
America, supra, this Court used this language: "These remarks,
and the reasoning of this opinion, are made without reference to a
case in wiiich the foreign law may directly prohibif the intloduction "ofd slave, or tiie retaining of him within the state for a certain
period, and declare the consequences of either of these, and we
decide no question as to th effect of such a -law."
In this case, the owner of Clarissa was apprised of what the law
of Pennsylvania was, when she sent her slave there, and determined to risk the consequences. That law was, that the slave
might be brought thdre, and her condition be unchanged for the
period of six months; but that, if she remained there longer than
that period of time, she should be deemed a free woman. Mrs.
Trigg was informed that such was the law of Pennsylvania, and
she resolved to hazard the consequences. And we think that in
suph a state of the case, the condition of Clarissa in that State, after
remaining in that State longer than six months, should follow her
to Kentucky, and be her condition here. Under the circumstances
she was free there, and should be free here. This result was
voluntarily incurred by her then owner, of which Mrs. Ferry was
apprised, and having taken her bill of sale for Clarissa with a full
knowledge of the circumstances, neither she nor her husband has
any cause to complain, especially as'she was also apprised that it
.was the intention bf Mrs. Trigg, that, at her death, or as soon
thereafter as the sum of $500 could be raised out of the means of
her estate to redeem Clarissa, (the raising of which sum, according
to Dudley, was prevented by herself,) Clarissa was to be free.
The authority not being accessible, we have not had an opportunity of examining the case of Stewart vs. Oakes, 5 Har. and Johnson, 107. But w; understand from the reference to this case,
made by Wheeler in his Law of Slavery, page 338, that the decision
of the Court in favor of the freedom of the plaintiff, was based upon
a statute of Virginia similar in its provisions to that of Pennsylvania. Wheeler says the Court held, that a slave carried at
different periods to Virginia by his owner, residing in Maryland,
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and employed working at his stone quarries, the several periods
amounting to one year, -such slave was entitled to his freedom
under the law of Virginia.
It is contended, that the statute of Pennsylvania not having
been marked as filed by the clerk of the Circuit Court, it ought
not to be regarded by this Court. It is, however, copied into the
record, and was manifestly used in evidence by the Court below,
and we think it should make no difference that it was not marked,
"filed" by the clerk.
Wherefore the decree is affirmed.
NoTE.-The case of Stewart vs. Oakes, will be found in a note'to Davis vs.
Jaquin, 5 Harris & Johns, 100, 107, and the point is correctly stated by Mr.
Wheeler.
This judgment was given in the Court of Oyer and Terminer, whence an appeal
was taken to the Court of Appeals, and in December Term, 1813, the latter Court
affirmed the judgment of the former.
The case of Davis vs. Jaquin, arose under the Pennsylvania statute of March 1,
0

178 , Dunlap Laws, 126, and a principal point was whether the owner of a slave
had been a sojourner with such slave, and had sent him away within six months,
which the Court held to be a question of fact to be submitted to a jury..

The. very

point now decided in Kentucky also arose in Maryland, but the Court declined
deciding it, 5 H. & J., 109.
The Tenth Section of the Pennsylvania Act, of March 1, 1780, has been the subject ofjudicial decision, by the Courts of that State, in The CommonweAlth vs.
Chambre, 4 Dall. 143, The Com. vs. Holloway, 6 Binn, 213, and in Butler vs.
Delaplaine, 7 S. & R., 378. But now-by the Act of March 3, 1847, Section 7, P.
L., 208, so much of that act as authorizes the masters and owners of slaves to bring
them within this Commonwealth, and retain them in involuntary servitude for any"
penod whatever, is repealed.
Since the passage of this latter act, a slave voluntarily brought within this state
becomes free. Ex parte Lewis Pierce, per KING, P. J.,C. P. Phil. Co., Oct. 1848,
Kauffman vs. Oliver, 10 Barr. 514, 518. See also Strader vs. Graham, 10 How.
U. S. Rep. 82.
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Supreme Court, _Pennsylva'nia, -December Term, 1852.
WILLIAM DEAL, THOMAS TUSTIN AND THOMAS JEFFRIES vs. THOMAS
BOGUE.
1. A Shelriff acting under an execution at the suit of a jildgment creditor of one
partner in a firm, can sell and deliver no part of the partnership goods, but only

the contingent interest of the debtor partner in-the stock and profits, after settlement of partnership accounts, and payment of.partnership creditors.

2. The only levy that can be made on such an execution, consistently with the principles of the partnership relation, is of the debtor's interest in the whole stock,
and that is to be measured by final account.
3. Where one partner sued the Sheriff, his deputy, and the execution creditor, in
trespass for seizing and selling the partnership goods on an execution against his
copartner, and the defendants pleaded not guilty; held, that the nonjoinder of all

the owners as plaintiffs could only be taken advantage of by plea in abatement,
and that such plea was too late after the general issue p]eaded.

.4. The Sheriff and his deputy were liable as trespassers in such case, in virtue of
their office.

The plaintiff in the execution would got be a trespasser, unless he

did something more than merely issue his writ; but if he'attended the sale and
bought part of the property, he is liable as a trespasser.

Writ ot error to the District Court of Philadelphia.
This was an action of trespass brought in the District Court of
Philadelphia, by Bogue, defendant in error, against Deal, Sheriff,
Tustin, Deputy Sheriff, an~d Jeffries, plaintiffs in error, for seizing
and selling certain personal property of said Bogue.
Previotis to January 8th, 1850, Thomas Bogue, and one Samuel
Archer, were joint owners of horses and carriages, at p livery stable
kept by them in .Philadelphia." On the 29th December, 1849,
Jeffries issued a fI. fa. against Archer alone; to which the Sheriff
returned, that he had, on 29th December, 1849, levied on -the personal property of the defendant, and sold the same January 17th,
1850, for.the sum of $1,144. Previous to the sale, viz: on' the
11th January, 1849, Bogue gave written notice to' the Sheriff,
stating that the property levied on belonged to himself and not to
the defendant in the execution, and that the only interest. the defendant had was an interest subject to* tnrtnership debts Not-
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withstanding this notice, the Sheriff proceeded to sell-and thereupon Bogue brought this action, and the jury rendered a verdict
for the plaintiff for $675 damages.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
WOODWARD, J.-It is established by the verdict that the goods
levied on by the Sheriff were partnership property-that they
belonged not to Archer, the defendant in the oxecution, but to
Bogue & Archer, as partners in the livery stable business.
The defendants on the trial asked the Court to say, that if, at
the time of the levy, the property levied on was the joint property
of Bogue & Archer, the plaintiff cannot recover. The Court declined to give such instruction, but ruled1st. That the Sheriff, though he had a right to seize and make
an inventory, had no right to take the goods out of the plaintiffs'
possession and deliver them to the purchaser.
2d. That the proper mode to take advantage of the fact that the
plaintiff was not sole owner of the goods was by plea in abatement,
which -was too late after the general issue pleaded.
These opinions are assigned for error:
That a sheriff acting under an execution at the suit of a judgment creditor of one partner can sell and deliver no part of the
partnership goods, but only the contingent interest of the debtor
partner in the stock and profits, after settlement of partnership
accounts and payment of partnership creditors, is a conclusion that
results necessarily out of the principles of the partnership relation,
and is sanctioned by a great number of modern decisions both in
England and the United States. What are some of the principles
of this relation ? It is a cofttract relation, and therefore no partncr can be introduced into it except upon consent. A purchaser
at a sheriff's sale of a partner's interest becomes a tenant in common with the other partners, so far as to entitle him to an account,
hut he does not become a partner. On the contrary, the sale works
a dissolution of the partnership as completely as the death, insanity,
or bankruptcy of a partner.
Partners are joint-tenants of all the stoc'k and: effects employed
in their business- No partner can have a separate interest in any
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part of the property. belonging to the partnership, though each has
an entire as well as joint interest in the whole of the joint property. A levy, then, to affect the interest of a partner cannot
touch a specific proportion of the goods, nor the whole, because
others have.propery in every part is well as the whole, coupled
with a right, resting in contract, to use them for the purposes for
which the partnership was instituted. The only levy that can be
made consistdntly with the relation the partners sustain to the
goods is of the debtor's interest in the whole, and that is to be
measured by. final account.
""
Again, it was a principle of the Roman liw, and'it has been
acknowledged in the jurisprudence of England and the United
States, that partnership creditors must'be first paid out of partnership property. Chancellor 1ent thinks the basis of the ruI& is,
that the funds are to be' liable on which the credit was given-an
opinion which Chief Justice Gibson questioned in .Donervs. Staufer,
.
'1 Penna7. R* 204.
But whatever the grounds of the rule, there is no question concerning the rule itself. It is constantly recognized in distribution
of assets, and is the vital element in the'contract of partnership
which gives it confidence with the public. But if a sheriff may deliver the goods of a firmoto purchasers in pursuance of a sale made,
not for a partnership debt, but for a debt of one of the partners,
what becomes of the equity of joint credit6rs? They are not in
court to contend for the purchase-money, and, if brought in and
their claims adjusted, that is hot the fund "towhich they gave credit,
and on which they have a lien. They are creditors of the partnership, and their lien.relates to the interest of all the partners in the
whole stock, and they cannot be cohpelled to look to any less security. Or shall they follow the goods sold into. the hands of the
purchasers? This, in most instances, would be impossible, and
always it would be substituting another and an inadequate security
for that which they looked to when credit was given to the firm.
Thus Would the fundamental principles of this beneficial relation
be subverted if a sheriff were permitted to seize'and sell the whole
or part of the stock in specie, on an execution against one partner.
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But it is as clear upon authority as upon principle that the court
were right in denying the power of the sheriff to sell and deliver
the goods. In Taylor vs. Fields, 4 Vesey, 369, the facts of which
case are more fully stated in 'a note to You 'g' vs. Keighly, 15
Vesey, 559, Chief Baron MicDonald -laid it down that the party
coming in right of the debtor partner comes into nothing more
than an interest in the partnership, which cannot be tangible, cannot be made available or be deliveted but under an account between
the partnership and the partner. To the same effect is the language of Judge Gibson, in Doner vs. Stauffer, 1 P. R. 198, and
Kramer vs. Arthurs, T Barr. 165. See also Story's Equity; vol.
1, p. 626-7, and the cases cited.
. Stock imr incorporated companies may be levied in execution and
sold on ft. fa., Lez vs. Potter, I6Penn. St. Rep. 295, and yet nobody ever supposed that the property represented-by that stock, or
any part of it, passed to the purchaser. Even in the sale of land
the sheriff delivers not the defendant's possession, but only his title.
It is a distinct proceeding that puts the purchaser into possession,
and if the sheriff should deliver possesfion upon his, venditioni
exponas, he would be a trespasser.
The ruling of the court, therefdre, -as in accordance with the
principles and analogies of the law as well as with its authorities.
As to the other point in the charge, the court were unquestionably right. The plaintiff claimed to be the sole owner of the goods
in virtue of a purchase of his partner~s interest between the time
of the levy and the sale, and, to the action instituted in his own
name, .,the defendants pleaded not guilty. After this, it was too
late to plead the non joinder of the other partner in abatement,
and yet it was only by such plea advantage could be taken of the
non-joinder. If' one of several part owners sue -alone in trespassr
the defendant can only take the advantage of it by plea in abatement, though the defect appear on the declaration. Addison vs.
Overend, 6 Term R. 766.
Another ground of defence was, that the plaintiff could not recover against the three defendants jointly. The sheriff and his
deputy were liable, virtute officii, for an illegal execution of the
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writ. If the plaintiff in the execution had merely issued his writ,
and left the sheriff to execute it without instructions, I do- not
say he could have been made liable.as' a trespasser; but it was in
evidence that Jeffries, the plaintiff in the execution, was present at
the sale, and bought two of the horses. Tlia was such participation as to make him a trespasser, and he was well joined in the
action.
It 'vas contended in the argument that there was no evidence of
the delivery of the goods.by the sherif and as the court held that
the trespass consisted not in levying on the goods, but in the sale
of them, they should have instructed the jury that a sale of them
without delivery was not a trespass.
Frederick Dick swore he was present at the sheriff's sale-sevenor eight -horses, several vehicles, and six or seven sets of harness
were sold,; that Tustin told him the amofmt of the sale was 81,144;
that Jeffries bought two horses; "the articles I saw go away.
Bogue's establishment was broken up. The goods were delivered
to the purchasers."

)Rutter says the goods were sold out under the execution; and
th retui-n of the sheriff on the ft. fa. shows a sale of the goods,
an& not of the interest of Archer.
Now, in view of such evidence, what other presumption wouldbe reasonable than that the sheriff delivered the goods to the purchasers. If the defendants wanted the opinion of the court on the
question whether such evidence proved a delivery, they should have
asked for it. In the absence of a prayer, the court were in no error
in submitting the evidence without instructions' to the jury. But
had the defendants sought an'd obtained inistructions they must
have been unfavorable to them, avd therefore they have no cause to
complain.
On the whole, we see no.error in this record, and the judgment
is accordingly affirmed.

